ABSTRACT The Internet of Things (IoT) has become a global sensory network that links physical and virtual objects by communicating and exploiting data and initiating physical actions. The evolution of this paradigm is already threatened by security issues, which constitute major risk factors that demand efficient solutions adapted to the IoT context. In this paper, we put forward a logical approach and systemic analysis that enables us to present the key aspects of new access control (AC) model for the IoT environments, called a pervasive-based access control model (PerBAC). Our approach is based on the study of important, reputable AC models that we use as a background for our proposed model. PerBAC is defined here based on a representation of the decision-making algorithm, a description of the abstract entities using the attributes as a fundamental concept and the collaboration aspects necessary to handle the case of multiple organizations. These attributes are the perfect recipient of the information collected by IoT environments from the physical world and allow optimal access control decisions to be taken according to dynamic rules and entities based on the algorithm. Our interpretation of the attributes, the dynamic entities and their exploitation by our proposed algorithm produce a new AC model adapted to the IoT paradigm.
I. INTRODUCTION
The IoT continues to gain momentum, with more connected devices coming onto the market every day; security is now becoming a major concern. IoT environments are increasingly being penetrated by hackers via numerous vulnerabilities [1] . With 20 billion objects already connected, the IoT is considered to be 'the digital earth nervous system' [2] , which in the near future will allow an understanding of and solutions to global phenomena that cannot be understood on the basis of local measures.
Actually, there is a large community of researches considering IoT as one of the main technological revolutions of this century [1] .
We can define the IoT as a global infrastructure of networked physical and virtual objects. These intelligent electronic devices ('things') need to have a unique identity and the ability to transfer/receive data over a network using the interoperable technologies offered by Internet
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protocols. As an ubiquitous network, the IoT is founded on four major pillars: sensing, communicating, actuating and processing, to provide services to various kinds of applications [3] .
Sensors and actuators play the role of data gateways, in the sense that they connect the physical world with the information world [4] , as shown in Figure 1 . The difference between a sensor and an actuator is that the first collects contextualized information from the physical world and sends it to the information world, while the second creates this information by generating actions.
The communication aspects are responsible for transporting data using web technologies, standards and protocols, some of which are more adapted than others to this constrained and pervasive contexts [5] .
Data processing is a main building bloc in the sense that it provides a multitude of services that constitute the base and eventually the goal of an IoT platform. However, this functionality is wired by the constrained aspects of the IoT devices. In this paper, we will sidestep using less constrained layers and computation offloading. Our representation of the computation layers, as shown in Figure 2 , is based on the concept of computation offloading. It allows the transfer of intensive computational tasks from one layer to another higher layer [6] , [7] . The constrained layer is most affected by the limitations of the IoT devices, which restrict computational power, storage, and energy. Computational offloading is therefore the ideal solution to transfer tasks to a less constrained layer and then to the offloading layer.
In the other hand, and based on various works and surveys [8] , the need for a specific AC model for IoT is a matter of urgency; but then again, unfortunately, existing AC models do not offer a global solution that is well adapted to the IoT context for many reasons. In fact, either they propose protocols that are memory and computationally expensive and/or do not consider the contextual information in the decision-making process. Our model mainly proposes an alternative to handle these limitations. This paper mainly presents three key contributions:
• The integration of two widely used AC models (ABAC [9] and OrBAC [10] ) by taking their advantages (i.e. the flexibility of ABAC and simplicity coming from the abstraction of OrBAC entities) while not inheriting their drawbacks (i.e. Complexity of ABAC and rigidity of OrBAC).
• The collaborative access control layer at crossorganizational level to enable a subject from one organization to benefit, by mean of contracts, from objects that are not necessarily in the same organization. The paper provides a quantitative and qualitative evaluation and comparison of the proposed approach with two widely used access control models. The preliminary results show some useful aspects of this work toward building a robust access control model for IoT.
In the following sections, we will introduce the concepts of AC and security policies in general. Then we will describe existing AC models so that we could clarify the strengths of PerBAC and its collaboration aspect in detail. Finally, we will conclude our paper by highlighting possible extensions of PerBAC.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we will introduce meta-models and terminology related to access control and security policies.
A. ACCESS CONTROL
AC can be considered as the ''process of mediating every request to resources and data maintained by a system and determining whether the request should be granted or denied'' [11] . The objective of the AC process is to limit the operations that each authorized user can execute. In this way, AC aims to avoid the execution of suspicious actions that could lead to a disorder in system security.
As shown in Figure 3 below, AC involves the following basic elements: subjects, objects, actions, a reference monitor and security rules. Subjects are the active entities of the system, and perform actions on objects. As passive entities, objects contain information and are manipulated by subjects.
It's worth noting that subjects can also be considered as objects and actions could present various types of operation carried out by subjects on objects to manipulate their states.
Note that there is an important difference between authentication and AC. The identification of users is an authentication task, while AC assumes that the user has been successfully authenticated and passes directly to making a decision on whether to accept or deny a request from the given user for a given resource.
In some prior models of AC, abstract concepts were used due to their efficiency [10] , [12] , [13] . Abstract entities that have begun to be used as standard practice are attributes, context, organization, activities, views and roles. These constitute the basic fragments of an abstract layer.
• The subject is an entity that executes an action. Each subject play (and then belongs to) a specific role(s). • The view is a group of objects that share similar features or characteristics.
• An activity is a group of one or more actions that share similar features or characteristics.
• The context refers to a specific situation or an environmental state. It enables specifying conditions for the validity of a security rule depending on situations.
• Attributes are the qualities or properties that characterize a given entity, for example an organization, object, subject, action or context.
• An organization can in general be seen as an organized group of active entities. It may be structured into several sub-organizations that have their own security policies. Adopting the notion of organization in our model is a remedy to the explosion of roles, views and activities. In fact, with this concept it will always be possible to define the business parameter of an organization and thus identify the roles (and other entities) attached to it.
Undoubtedly, if we talk about Smart city for example, we will have an explosion of roles, but our idea is to subdivide this large perimeter into several organizations (e.g. smart parking, Smart Park, etc...) and in each of them we will have a reasonable number of abstract entities to manage.
Some models propose four levels of access [10] , [13] , which can be divided into denied and allowed types of access, as shown in Fig. 4 ; these levels are obligation, recommendation, permission and interdiction.
More formally, interdictions represent a refusal to grant permission to a role r to carry out an activity ay on a view v. They are the ideal way to specify exceptions: for example, when all subjects in a role except for one specific subject are allowed to perform tasks. Obligations relate to activities/actions that must be carried out, otherwise the system will enter an unsafe state. Consequently, they can be considered as mandatory permissions. Recommendations are permissions that do not reach the same degree of constraint as an obligation; this mode of access is somewhat preventive.
B. SECURITY POLICIES
XACML [14] is a widely used standard for both the expression of security policies and the description of query/response decisions for AC, due to its portability and its mechanisms that offer granular access control for granting or denying privileges. In addition, XACML provides the ability to express distributed AC policies, which will be very useful for the collaborative aspects of our AC model.
In XACML, every access decision is made by following the steps shown in Figure 5 . First, the policy administration point (PAP) provides the complete security policy to the policy decision point (PDP). Each access request arrives at the policy enforcement point (PEP), which creates an XACML request and sends it to the PDP. This latter invokes the services of the policy information point (PIP) to retrieve the attributes related to subjects, objects, actions and context. The PDP evaluates the request based on the rules provided by the PAP and the attributes obtained from the PIP. The AC decision made by the PDP at the end of this process is, then, sent to the PEP: the decision is either a permission or a ban, and is coupled with obligations. The PEP enforces these obligations and either authorizes or denies access, in accordance with the PDP decision.
In the next section, we will present an overview of the state of the art in the AC domain.
III. RELATED WORKS
In this section, we will describe the main existing AC models that we could use as a background for our IoT-oriented AC model.
As part of our work to find the right AC model for IoT, we analyzed several well-known models, including discretionary access control (DAC), role-based access control (RBAC) [12] and organization-based access control (OrBAC) [10] . Other models have examined AC in the IoT context by considering their constraints (such as large numbers of devices, heterogeneity and constrained nodes); however, these all have limitations in the IoT regarding their centralized approach or face numerous implementation problems.
AC models can be classified into three architectures:
• Centralized models such as OrBAC and RBAC;
• Distributed models such as ABAC [9] , UCON, PolyOr-BAC [15] , multi-OrBAC [16] and O2O [17] ;
• Hybrid models such as Smart-OrBAC [18] . Although OrBAC and ABAC have several strengths, they do not consider the specifications of IoT environment. In the VOLUME 7, 2019 next subsection, we describe these models and other ones, given their importance in this field.
A. ORBAC AND ITS EXTENSIONS
The OrBAC model uses the concept of an organization as a structured group of active entities in which subjects play specific roles. An activity is a group of one or more actions, a view is a group of objects, and a context is a specific situation [10] . OrBAC relies on the concept of two complete abstraction levels in order to manage the complexity of its security policies: an abstract level and a concrete level. Another entity is also introduced in this model: the context. This enables us to specify conditions for the validity of a security rule depending on the specific situation.
The two separate levels of abstraction offer the possibility of describing evolving security policies (SP). In fact, a SP described by means of abstract elements avoids the processing of each particular access request -i.e. the treatment of each triplet (s, o, a). Clearly such SP require much less rules than if they were to be described by concrete elements.
In security rules, permissions are expressed as permissions(Org, R, V, Ay, C), and obligations and prohibitions are defined in a similar way. An expression is interpreted as follows: in a given context C, an organization Org grants a role R permission to perform an activity Ay on the view V .
OrBAC has many extensions; multi-OrBAC and polyOrBAC add a distributed dimension. I-OrBAC [13] takes the integrity requirement as a basic constraint, while SmartOrBAC provides an architecture for the AC model in the IoT. The drawback of multi-OrBAC is due to the complexity of the definition of its security policy; this must take into account entities belonging to other organizations, and therefore requires mutual trust between organizations to manage these entities. Poly-OrBAC overcomes this issue by integrating the OrBAC model to represent the internal policies of each organization, and using web services technology to ensure interoperability between organizations; however, these approaches, such as SOA-based web services, are not well adapted to IoT-constrained devices. SmartOrBAC uses a hybrid architecture and a model based on a partitioning of the AC process into functional layers (a constrained layer, a less constrained layer, an organization layer and a collaboration layer) based on the particular abilities of each. It aims to combine the OrBAC model with an IoT layer, and its key aspect is the introduction of the idea of context to meet the IoT requirements.
However, in IoT environments, OrBAC suffers from a critical weakness; it is based on a centralized architecture, which represents the source of many problems, both in terms of large-scale implementations as well as from a security point of view. More details of the drawbacks of centralized architectures in the IoT context are presented in [19] . In addition, neither OrBAC nor its extensions offer any lightweight tools or mechanisms, hence this makes them too complex to implement on IoT-constrained devices.
B. ABAC
ABAC is one of the latest AC models to appear and is currently used on a very large scale. It introduced the innovative concept of simplifying AC management and AC rules [9] .
ABAC makes a decision to grant or deny access to resources by evaluating the attributes of various entities (object, subject, action and environment). These attributes are therefore the main components and key concepts on which ABAC is built, and may include any feature of AC entities that can characterize them.
Many publications have addressed IoT based on the ABAC model [20] - [23] . Ning et al. [24] have recently proposed an authentication and AC system for what they called the IoT perception layer. Their algorithm answers the problems of constrained devices in IoT environments by proposing lower storage and communication overheads. Moreover, one of the major advantages of attribute-based AC models is the fine-grained control ensured by basing decisions on the intrinsic characteristics of any entity. However, this aspect also generates many drawbacks, the most significant of which is the complex deployment and management of this model in IoT-constrained nodes ABAC suffers from this complexity (too expressive), especially since the solution must be implemented using IoT nodes, which are known to be less powerful in terms of computation or storage capacities [8] .
Moreover, ABAC alone suffers from the lack of applications for implementing security policies based on verified and/or meaningful values rather than on raw data flowing from the sensors [23] .
C. UCON
The usage control (UCON) model proposed in [25] and [26] is ranked among the next generation of AC models, as it includes a variety of new concepts compared to many traditional AC models such as RBAC and ABAC. It handles the problem of authorization in a continuous way before, during and after access execution. It also offers the benefit of attribute mutability; if there is any change during the process of AC decision making that affects the attributes, previously granted access is revoked and the usage is cancelled, and vice versa.
However, this solution is still not sufficient in the IoT context, first because UCON still does not have a precise representation of its rigorous definition [10] . It does not provide further details [16] , [18] of the access process for the IoT; and finally, it is only a conceptual model for which an actual construction for the IoT needs much more research [27] .
D. CAPBAC
The concept of capability was first proposed as a 'ticket' giving a user access to an entity.
As its name suggests, capability-based access control (CapBAC) is based on the concept of capability, and involves rights that are granted to the entity holding this capability.
Unfortunately, applying the original concept of capabilitybased models to the IoT has led to propagation and revocation, which are among the major weaknesses of traditional capability-based models.
Although CapBAC offers more flexibility and distribution than previous models, it also has some limitations from an IoT perspective; in particular, it does not take context into account in the AC decision-making process [8] .
E. MULTI FACTOR
In this paper [28] Riad and Yan came with a model that dynamically supports changing the user's assigned permissions based on its trust level.
TB-AC (standing for Trust Based Access Control) has been implemented on a separated VM in their private cloud environment and the experimental results indicated that TB-AC can evaluate access requests within reasonable and acceptable processing times, which is based on the final trust level calculation and the communication between TB-AC and some of the intended OpenStack services.
That being said, this work is not IoT oriented, and is mainly based on the Cloud. And as we have seen and we will see in next sections, the hybrid approach brings more flexibility and adaptability to IoT environments, both in architecture and the model itself.
F. HYBRID
Ben Attia et al. [29] proposed a new ''hybrid access control model'' based on the two aforementioned models RBAC and ABAC. With their implementation they provide a proof of work and several results, they claim that the new hybrid model brings more flexibility, scalability and fine-grained capacity. However, as we will see afterward, our model brings more flexibility and abstraction due to the fact that it is based on OrBAC and not RBAC.
In the next section, we describe our proposed IoT AC model, PerBAC.
IV. THE PROPOSED PERBAC MODEL
Given the aforementioned limitations of the popular and widely adopted AC models in IoT environments, and given the importance of AC in such environments, it goes without saying that there is a serious need for an IoT-adapted solution. Actually, based on our analysis of different models in the previous section, we build our model based, mainly, on ABAC as a global standard AC model [9] . This model uses the concept of attributes, which is very advantageous in decentralized IoT environments, and also includes several abstract concepts and other generic AC models such as RBAC. We enrich ABAC not only with additional features from OrBAC and its extensions, but also with an original security approach that meets the basic IoT requirements. The result is our proposed model, PerBAC, a proactive, multi-layer model that enables the smart use of attributes and well-known abstract entities.
A. PERBAC REQUIREMENTS
To implement PerBAC, first we need to define the requirements of a standard IoT environment regarding access control. It is clear that an IoT environment may have different requirements that change from one context to another. However, without global requirements that encompass standard IoT situations, we cannot define an AC model that will handle them efficiently.
We characterize these requirements based on the four pillars of the IoT, which can be used as an approach to defining global requirements: sensing, actuating, communicating and processing.
We consider the attributes to be an ideal choice as they correspond to the sensing and actuating aspects of an IoT system. These attributes can dynamically represent the data collected by an IoT environment from the physical and information worlds, and can be used to facilitate AC decisions. Moreover, since the information collected by the sensors and actuators can change contextually, a dynamic AC model will be created through these dynamic rules and entities.
The communication pillar requires an AC policy that is able to interact rapidly with other organizations wanting to use an IoT platform, as this may occur in the real world.
The processing aspect of PerBAC is achieved through the application of computation offloading, based on our representation of the three computational layers, as illustrated in Fig. 2 above.
All the entities are characterized by attributes. We define attributes as in [9] : ''Attributes are characteristics of the subject, object, or environment conditions. Attributes contain information given by a name-value pair''. We also introduce the notions of abstract attributes (such as role, activity, view and context) that are adapted to our model; for example, a subject belongs to a role if, in this context, the attributes related to the subject fulfil the predefined conditions of the role.
The AC policy in PerBAC evolves incrementally over the system lifecycle. This is because the IoT context is a large and complex system that is in a constant state of change. The ability to modify a policy to meet the changing needs of an organization is a central feature of PerBAC. The entities may be configured directly by the platform owner (PO) or indirectly by appropriate roles delegated by the PO.
We will use the definitions presented in Section II-A to describe the entities used by PerBAC. Ownership is also an important aspect of the IoT and this is reflected in PerBAC. The PO of a collection of resources is consequently the resource owner of each resource in this collection. 
B. A MULTI-LAYER MODEL
The use of the concept of attributes as an essential part of our PerBAC model means that it is more dynamic, pro-active and responsive to the needs of the IoT context.
In our model, matching of the abstract layer with the concrete one is established through the matching function shown in Figure 6 .
Attributes at the abstract layer are considered to be logical/abstract attributes with many conditions, while attributes at the concrete layer are physical/concrete attributes. The concept of matching in PerBAC is relatively straightforward: if the attributes of a concrete entity (subject, object or action) characterize the corresponding abstract entity (role, view or activity, respectively), then the former is automatically matched to the latter. The attributes of an organization will be simultaneously concrete and abstract.
C. THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OF PERBAC
In this section, we describe the workflow or succession of steps that a system implementing the PerBAC model follows when making a decision to allow or prohibit access for a subject to a requested resource (object).
To do that, we use two explanatory figures: Fig. 7 gives an explicit and intuitive illustration of the steps through which an access request passes, while Fig. 8 presents the algorithm in a more formal way using a pseudo code interpretation.
The subject s first sends a request req(org, s, o, a) to a requested object o on which she wants to perform an action a. This request specifies the organization org containing the requested resource, the specifications of the subject, object and action.
The request is received by the PEP and then redirected to the PDP after the extraction of some global attributes also known as environmental attributes (att) [16] . PDP sends a request to the PIP for the attributes of the entities it has just received. Once these are obtained, the request will be passed to the match function to concatenate the concrete entities (subject s, object o, action a) with abstract ones respectively (role R, view V , activity Ay). Note that the match function also creates coordination between the global attributes and the context C [30] .
Note also that global attributes refer to all the characteristics that lead us to define a given context. For example, they could be time, weather, the risk of taking an action and so on.
We can presume that global attributes will be collected by the central node in the hybrid architecture previously cited.
Now that all the necessary information on all the stakeholders has been collected, the PDP searches the AC policy of the organization and makes the right decision based on the information processed. This decision is then sent to the PEP, which informs the requesting subject.
Most of the time, the central nodes play the role of the PEP for their end nodes, the less constrained layer, the computational/offloading layer will have a cloud component or a dedicated server. This component fulfils the roles of the PDP/PIP/PAP and can match various attributes to accelerate the decision process.
To simplify our model, we have so far defined interdiction and permission as the only two outputs (deny and allow) of our AC model. However, PerBAC also supports the permission levels of obligation and recommendation, and these can be defined in the organization's AC policy and/or in contracts.
In the next section, we extend our algorithm to include the collaboration layer.
D. COLLABORATION IN PERBAC
The communication requirement of the IoT enforces us to move away from the concept of a centralized architecture. To achieve this, we opt to extend our model by providing a collaborative layer between organizations. This layer allows the subjects of a given organization to benefit from objects that do not need to be within the same organization.
In order to respond to these needs, PerBAC defines three forms of contracts, as shown in Fig. 9 .
We suppose the existence of an organization P which has its own subjects, objects, AC policy etc., and we assume that this organization needs to interact with an external entity, which may be either a subject or an object of another organization.
To sum up, we examine the case where a subject S1, not enrolled in P, wants to access (carry out an action on) an object O1 of the organization P. In our model, there are three situations in which this action can be performed, and thus three types of contracts that the organization P must offer:
• A public contract: Org_P defines (minimum) conditions for any organization wanting to sign this contract, and generally no conditions are imposed. This contract is used for public resources (e.g. a bench in a public garden) and is a pre-signed contract that is predefined in the AC policy (PAP). No negotiation between the collaborators is required.
• A private contract: Here, the rules are already defined by Org_P, and the contract contains predefined terms. If the applicant subject satisfies these terms, access is granted; otherwise, it is denied. Private contracts are also predefined in the AC policy (PAP). • A customized contract: This involves negotiation between two different organizations. For example, negotiating a subscription for smart parking, as described in the case study at the end on this paper.
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Note that the above contracts are arranged in order of complexity, thus according to the time required for the establishment and execution of each of them. If required, distributed architectures can be used within the same organization, using several PDPs and/or Blockchain platforms, for example [31] .
Finally, before giving an implementation as a proof of work of our model, it is worth noting that the fact that PerBAC is based on OrBAC and thus on its abstract entities, makes it suitable and well adapted to IoT environments. In fact, VOLUME 7, 2019 TABLE 1. Evaluation of our model compared to two famous and large used models.
these abstract entities bring the possibility of large-scale adaptation, as well as the coverage of heterogeneous devices since OrBAC has no limitation in size or capacity so it can define an extensible policy. Consequently, it is easily applicable to large-scale environments such as IoT [18] .
The following section describes the application of PerBAC in a case study of smart parking.
V. PRACTICAL ILLUSTRATION OF PerBAC

A. SMART PARKING: DESCRIPTION
In our case study we will narrow down the perimeter to a situation simple enough to facilitate the implementation and evaluation but at the same time rich enough to reveal all the stakeholders of our model. The case study involves a smart parking lot in which there are a large number of parking places, each of which is equipped with several sensors and actuators for the purpose of collecting local attributes. The parking lot has only one entrance and one exit. Furthermore, parking spaces are divided into several areas or zones, each of which is managed by a central node. In this case study, we will consider two areas: a standard zone that is accessible to everyone (public) under a public contract, and a zone for people with reduced mobility (PRM), which is managed by a private contract. PRMs are identified by a blue badge.
B. SMART PARKING: IDENTIFICATION
To request a parking place, a vehicle is identified by its plate.
The person may present a PRM identification badge, and in this case, the central node for PRM (CN_PRM) is consulted as a priority. In all other cases it is the standard central node (CN_STANDARD) that is consulted first.
C. NODE CHOICE PROCESS
Before launching the AC process, the algorithm needs to select the appropriate central node to handle the incoming request. Below is a UML sequence diagram that explains the central node selection process.
In this diagram, the car is acting as the subject. If the driver of the car presents a valid blue badge, then the central node for PRM (CN_DP) is selected after a successful badge check. If the blue badge check fails, the standard central node is selected to handle the request. 
D. ACCESS CONTROL PROCESS
After selecting the appropriate central node, the algorithm launches the decision-making process to determine access to the resource (the parking space). Fig. 12 below presents a UML sequence diagram for this process. VOLUME 7, 2019 Let us consider a car arriving at the entrance of the smart parking lot. After the identification step, the central node extracts several global attributes, and then sends the request to the PDP. This module then consults the PIP to obtain additional information and the PAP to check the security policy, so that it can then take a decision on whether to allow or deny access to a space in the car park.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION & EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have implemented our model PerBAC as well as the case study of the smart parking presented above in Fig. 11 . All the materials can be consulted in our GitHub repository [32] .
Technically, the system consists of ultrasonic sensors allowing us to detect the presence of a car, and actuators (LEDs, alarms). These sensors and actuators are connected with an Arduino which is a microcontroller with fairly good performance in terms of energy consumption, integration etc.
We also used a Raspberry Pi as a less constrained node. It's a single-card nano computer with 1.2GHz 64-bit quadcore ARMv8 processor, an 802.11n integrated WiFi module, 1GB RAM and 4 USB USB connectivity. It will be linked to our Arduino boards by intermediate serial ports.
Furthermore, we connected our nodes to Artik's cloud platform that stores information provided by centralized local units (Raspberry Pi).
In addition, the implementation covers also two mains advantages of PerBAC: The offloading aspect in order to ensure a decentralized architecture while remaining effective as ABAC or RBAC, and the collaboration between several organizations. In fact, as discussed earlier in this paper, the IoT avoids the centralized architecture, and to ensure that, we opted to extend our model by providing a collaborative layer between organizations, this layer will allow the subjects of an organization to benefit from objects that are not necessarily in the same organization.
The table 1 above, presents an evaluation of our model compared to two famous and large used models (RBAC with ZEND library and ABAC) according to many test scenarios.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The IoT is no longer a simple concept or research field, it is becoming a very large-scale sensory network in which actuation capabilities are removing the traditional boundaries between the physical and the virtual worlds. It has also raised several new challenging security issues, particularly in terms of the right AC model for the IoT context.
In this paper, we have explained the IoT paradigm from several perspectives, and have described the main trends over recent decades, which are continually accelerating and involve growing numbers of smart objects. Following this, we focused on a security study of IoT platforms, and more precisely AC for the IoT. We then examined the more widely known and used AC models by illustrating both their advantages and their weaknesses in IoT situations, and presented the various aspects of the PerBAC model. We began by framing the requirements of an IoT environment based on the four main pillars, and then gave a detailed description of PerBAC, including its components, layers and algorithm. We have also shown that our model is not restricted to centralized architectures but can be extended to decentralized ones through collaboration. Finally, we presented a proof of concept for PerBAC by implementing it in a real case study.
In the future, we intend to deploy PerBAC in a real smart parking environment and enrich it through collaboration between multiple car parkings as part of a smart city project. AISSAM OUTCHAKOUCHT received the bachelor's degree in applied mathematics from Cadi Ayyad University, Marrakesh, in 2014, and the master's degree in cryptography and information security from Mohammed V University, Rabat. He is currently pursuing the Ph.D. degree with the Computer Science Department, ENSEM School, Hassan II University. His research interests include the IoT security and machine learning. VOLUME 7, 2019 
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